In global mobility networks (GLOMONET), to provide secure and privacy-preserving communication among authorized mobile users in roaming services is not an easy task. To achieve authorized communication, mutual authentication is performed among legal users in GLOMONET. Therefore, security as well as privacy should be addressed in designing the security protocols for GLOMONET. In recent years, most of the research work is focused on one-way authentication and does not have desirable security attributes. In this paper, we discuss the development of authentication protocol for GLOMONET. To address security and privacy issues in authorized communication, we proposed a provably secure authentication protocol for GLOMONET. To identify the resistance against known attacks, we have analyzed the scheme against all known attacks. The comparative study on the security and performance with the related results manifests that the proposed scheme addresses the security and privacy challenges and avails comparable performance.
Introduction
Global Mobility Networks (GLOMONET) provide the roaming services for the mobile users, which enable them to use the extended services in their home agent whenever they enter into a foreign agent zone irrespective of their locations [2] . When a mobile user (MU) enters a foreign agent zone, there should be some mechanism of communication between a mobile user, home agent (HA), and foreign agent (FA). A conventional frame for roaming service is shown in Figure 1 . To communicate with FA, firstly, a session is developed with the home agent by MU. Then, MU communicates with FA with the help of HA. A registered MU gets the services only when he/she is successfully authenticated by FA. Meanwhile, in practice, two major concerns (privacy and security) are identified in roaming services. Thus, in attaining the roaming services, the mutual authentication mechanism is designed to address the issues of authorized communication. The secure communication is being achieved using key agreement [1, 21, 27] . As the communication technologies are developing rapidly, the entire world is reciprocally more connected. Due to this privacy risks are at stake. Privacy concerns have increasingly got attention from governments, corporations, and individuals. It is desirable to control sensitive information. However, in the environment of Internet where information sharing is very easy, this problem (controlling sensitive information) does not have an easy solution. Thus, a balanced approach is required between information sharing and privacy.
For roaming services in GLOMONET, the first authentication scheme was introduced by Zhu and Ma [36] . Since then, there were many proposals for a secure design with low computation cost [6, 10-11, 18-19, 29, 31] . It is observed that most of the existing similar schemes failed to provide the user anonymity along with untraceability.
In 2011, two new authentication schemes were proposed by Chen et al. [4] [5] . However, Xie et al. [33] enlightened the security shortcomings of both the schemes. For roaming services, Mun et al. [22] gave an anonymous authentication scheme in 2012. However, Mun et al.' s scheme is shown failure by Kim and Kwak [15] due to the design flaws in their scheme.
Based on quadratic residue, Jiang et al. [13] gave an authentication scheme. But, Wen et al. [30] and He et al. [12] both pointed out that service attack, replay attack and impersonation attack are not addressed in Jiang et al.'s scheme. To overcome the security flaws, Wen et al. [30] and He et al. [12] independently presented improved schemes. Using the modular exponentiation operations, Shin et al. [26] gave an efficient authentication scheme. Unfortunately, Farash et al. [9] pointed out that both [30] and [26] failed to resist user traceability, impersonation attack and session key disclosure attack. Due to these failures, a lightweight authentication scheme has been presented by them.
Recently (2015), Zhang et al. [34] designed an authentication scheme by adopting symmetric key and rational points multiplication in elliptic curve to preserve the privacy in GLOMONET. As a part of our case study, we figured out that their scheme fails to ensure the security goals. We came across some security shortcomings Figure 1 Conventional frame for roaming services _ Furthermore, the proposed scheme is computationally efficient in comparison to Zhang et al. ' s scheme and performs better in comparison to other existing similar schemes.
Cryptographic Preliminaries

Elliptic Curve
An elliptic curve E over a finite field F P consists of points satisfying the equation y 2 = x 3 + ax + b mod p along with the point at infinity, where a, b ∈ F p and 4a 3 + 27b 2 mod p ≠ 0. We omit mod p and draw out the following assumptions [17] .
Assumption1:
Ellipticcurvediscretelogarithmproblem(ECDLP): Suppose P, Q ∈G with Q = αP, it is computationally hard to compute the integer α, where G is the group of rational points on the elliptic curve E(F p ).
Assumption2:
EllipticcurveDiffie-Hellmanproblem(ECDHP):
If αP, βP ∈ G and α, β are positive integers, it is hard to compute αβP.
Biohashing
Biometric systems are applicable for human authentication in validating the security task to enable the authorized access, however, these systems face specific security challenges such as noisy data input which causes denial of service attack. It has impact on the usability of the system by failing to identify authorized consumers [23] . To overcome these problems, BioHashing technique is introduced [28] . It has substantial functional advantages such as clean separation of the genuine, zero error rate and imposter populations [14] . It has the following functions: _ Extraction of biometric parameter represented in a vector form n Γ ∈  , where n is the feature length. ap of the Paper as follows. In Section 2, we present the review of Zhang et al.'s scheme. Security t al.'s scheme are shown in Section 3. The proposed authentication scheme is urther, in Section 5, we present our provably secure scheme in formal model. curity analysis and discussion of the proposed scheme is done in Section 6. In nce of our scheme with the other existing similar schemes is compared. Finally, in Section 8. 
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Road Map of the Paper
The details are as follows. In Section 2, we present the review of Zhang et al.'s scheme. Security weaknesses of Zhang et al. ' s scheme are shown in Section 3. The proposed authentication scheme is provided in Section 4. Further, in Section 5, we present our provably secure scheme in formal model.
The informal security analysis and discussion of the proposed scheme is done in Section 6. In Section 7, the performance of our scheme with the other existing similar schemes is compared. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 8.
Review of Zhang et al.'s Scheme
Registration Phase
MU registers with the home agent HA if he/she wishes to get services from Global Mobility Network [34] . In this phase, the communication with the participants is done through secure communication channel.
R1. MU selects his/her identity ID
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Review of Zhang et al.'s Scheme
Registration Phase
MU registers with the home agent HA if he/she wishes to get services from Global Mobi Network [34] . In this phase, the communication with the participants is done through sec communication channel.
R1 ID V and a random number n is generated to unde computations using HA's master key K,
ID ID C MID m into SC. and a random number n is generated to undergo
Authentication and Key Establishment Phase
ID ID C MID m into SC.
The registered MU opts services from FA. Before this, both the parties agree upon a common session key. Moreover, the communication between FA and HA is done through the secure channel. The details are shown as follows:
A1. MU inputs his/her login credentials into the smartcard to compute
A1. MU inputs his/her login credentials into the smartcard to compute = ( ) 
Update Session Key
Interested readers can refer to [34] .
Security Pitfalls of Zhang et al.'s Scheme
Adversary Model
The security of Zhang et al.'s scheme is analyzed under the following security model [7-8, 16, 20] :
1. Over the public channel, Adversary/Attacker (  ) has the ability to eavesdrop all the communications between the parties.
2.  attains the potential to delete, modify, resend or to redirect the eavesdropped transmitted messages.
3. By analyzing the method of power analysis and consumption or from the leaked 
Update Session Key
Interested readers can refer to [34] . 
Security Pitfalls of Zhang et al.'s Scheme
Adversary Model
The security of Zhang et al.'s scheme is analyzed under the following security model [7-8, 16, 20] : tions between the parties.
2  attains the potential to delete, modify, resend or to redirect the eavesdropped transmitted messages.
3 By analyzing the method of power analysis and consumption or from the leaked information, the information from the smart card can be extracted by . 4  can be an insider of the system.
Disadvantages:
1 No verification mechanism for user's login credentials to check the legitimacy of the user. ID allows  to differentiate the users in every different login sessions which may breach the privacy of the user. Therefore, we claim that privacy of the user was not taken proper care as refered in [34] .
User Impersonation Attack
We have seen that  is able to compute V ′ (i.e., According to Subsection 3.3.1, adversary guesses the password of MU and computes V ′ . Further  decrypts ID allows  to differentiate the users in every different login sessions which may breach the privacy of the user. Therefore, we claim that privacy of the user was not taken proper care as refered in [34] .
We have seen that  is able to compute V ′ (i.e., = ( ) 
Replay Attack
The adversary  can capture the previously communica 3.1.  uses the communicated messages and replays the same m is transmitted to HA via FA as there is no fresh verification o Therefore, Zhang et al.'s scheme does not prevent  from sendi
Absence of Unauthorized Login Detection
A user may sometime fail to correctly map different pas Thus, login credential verification should be supported at initial s lacks user credential verification mechanism in login phase. Lac scheme inefficient.
The Proposed Scheme
In proposed scheme,
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The adversary  can capture the previously communicated messages as described in Section 3.1.  uses the communicated messages and replays the same message (say 1 m ) to FA and the same is transmitted to HA via FA as there is no fresh verification of the messages sent by MU at HA . Therefore, Zhang et al.'s scheme does not prevent  from sending the replay messages.
Absence of Unauthorized Login Detection
A user may sometime fail to correctly map different password to his/ her different accounts. Thus, login credential verification should be supported at initial stage. However, Zhang et al.'s scheme lacks user credential verification mechanism in login phase. Lack of efficient login phase makes the scheme inefficient.
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is the secret key of FA. FA and HA also share a common secret key FH K . Furthermore, FA and HA also compute their public keys H K P and F K P, respectively.
Registration Phase
This phase utilizes the secure channel to communicate with the participants. MU registers with HA, if he/she wishes to get services from Global Mobility Network.
1 MU selects his/her identity MU ID , password MU PW , computes lacks user credential verification mechanism in login phase. Lack of efficient login phase makes the scheme inefficient.
The Proposed Scheme
and HA also share a common secret key FH K . Furthermore, FA and HA also compute their public keys H K P and F K P , respectively.
Registration Phase
1 
Login, Authentication and Key Establishment Phase
In this phase, the communication between FA and HA is done through the secure channel. The registered MU opts services from FA. Before this, both the parties agree upon a common session key which is described as follows:
1 MU inputs his/her login credentials into the smartcard to compute
1. MU inputs his/her login credentials into the smartcard to compute
and timestamp 1 T and 
Update Session Key
Assume that MU stays in the FA network zone for consecutive sessions. In this scenario, this would be inefficient for MU to perform re-authentication procedure with FA and by involving HA to Table 3 .
ession Key
If verification holds, MU computes
Login, Authentication and Key Establishment Phase
1. MU inputs his/her login credentials into the smartcard to compute 
Update Session Key
Assume that MU stays in the FA network zone for consecutive sessions. In this scenario, this , and
T and computes || ( || ) || ). on of this phase is shown in Table 3 . 
Login, Authentication and Key Establishment Phase
Update Session Key
Assume that MU stays in the FA network zone for consecutive would be inefficient for MU to perform re-authentication procedure w , , , 
Assume that MU stays in the FA network zone for consecutive sessions. In this s would be inefficient for MU to perform re-authentication procedure with FA and by invo The illustration of this phase is shown in Table 3 .
Assume that MU stays in the FA network zone for consecutive sessions. In this scenario, this would be inefficient for MU to perform re-authentication procedure with FA and by involving HA to attain a session key. So, in this case, without communicating with HA, both MU and FA undergo one-time authentication where they can update the session key using the earlier established session key.
U1:
Suppose that a session key 
Formal Security Analysis of Our Scheme
We first present the security model and algorithm assumptions that are scheme. We present the formal security analysis by the method of provable securi
Security Model
The adaptability of provable security is to evaluate the invincibility of o well-known attacks.
The participants are mobile user MU ∈  , home agent HA∈  FA∈  .
Adversary Capabilities
Let  controls the simulator and queries oracles to destroy the privacy o session keys. The dictionary  size is a fixed constant which does not chan parameter  which  tries to destroy in PPT. The security parameter  is the On the following queries,  performs simulation in the oracles: 
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. If this verification holds, both the parties update the session key as = ( )
Formal Security Analysis of Our Scheme
We first present the security model and algorithm assumptions that are used in proving our scheme. We present the formal security analysis by the method of provable security [9, 32] . 
Security Model
The adaptability of provable security is to evaluate the invincibility of our scheme against the wellknown attacks.
The participants are mobile user MU ∈ , home agent HA∈  and foreign agent FA∈ .
Adversary Capabilities
Let  controls the simulator and queries oracles to destroy the privacy of authentication or the session keys. The dictionary  size is a fixed constant which does not change upon the security parameter  which  tries to destroy in PPT. The security parameter  is the session key bit-length. On the following queries,  performs simulation in the oracles: We specify few definitions to illustrate our proof as shown below in Figures 1 and 2 . We have given the simulation of the queries in the interest of readers: Π is MF-AKEfresh if the following queries do not occur:
) has been asked.
3 Security: The adversary 's advantage against our scheme Π is the probability that  correctly guesses the bit b generated in
Our scheme is MF AKE secure where, G τ denotes the time to compute the point mul- π is done by considering the definitions [1] [2] [3] which are intended to be conveyed faithfully, i.e., both , s i j π and , t j i π will receive the fairly established message by which both the oracles can agree upon a session key. Since, * , p Z α β ∈ , the session key 1 4 = ( || ( || ) || )
MF -AKESecurity
is considered to be random for every established session which is from the key space. Now, to prove that our scheme meets the second and third conditions. A consecutive sequence of games (0 5) 
which is the difference of probability of success between i G and
Once  finishes the last game 5 G , the MF AKE Security − game can only be won with probability 1/ 2 . The detail description of the games are as follows: is considered to be random for every established session which is from the key space. Now, to prove that our scheme meets the second and third conditions. A consecutive sequence of games (0 5) is an output random value. In addition, considering all the queries such as (Send, Execute, Reveal, and Test), all the instances are simulated as in the real protocol. The result of the simulation is indistinguishable from the real attack unless the following events take place:
The permutation property of encryption/ decryption fails which means there will be some collisions on the encryption/decryption.
Event 2:
The hash function is prone to collisions. Thus, the probability of the two events is restricted to 
A h ID K P ID T α
. We also imbed P α into the protocol and substitute P α in game 4 G for P α . Now a random oracle is used to output a random value as the values α and β are unknown. Therefore, we cannot compute , F P K P αβ α as well as the session key. Suppose the output of the random oracle is h, then we let the session key 1 4 = ( || ( || ) || )
In such case, if  has computed the real session key himself, i.e., he has computed 1 4 = ( || ( || ) || )
we can obtain P αβ and solve the ECDH problem by using  as a subroutine. Now we see, the games 5 G 
Discussions on Some Attacks
Stolen Smartcard Attack
In this case, either the smartcard of the user is stolen or found by an attacker. Then the information stored in the smartcard { , , , }
ID Z L V can be extracted by the power analysis attack [7-8, 16, 20] 
Privileged Insider Attack
The password, MU PW of MU is not sent as plaintext.
MU computes and sends
The password,
by using a random m Z ∈ from a registration request phase. In additio retrieving
MU
PW
from i Y is computationa insider attack.
Replay Attack
As described in our proposed sche timestamp of MU, and FA. The legal parti freshness of the incoming message. Thus ou
Impersonation Attack
In the roaming authentication, we n on MU, on visiting FA, and finally on HA. T 1. MU: Suppose, the adversary Firstly,  must overcome the authenticat MU 's secret Y is computationally infeasible. Therefore, our proposed scheme resists the insider attack.
Replay Attack
As described in our proposed scheme, every transmitted message is included with a built-in timestamp of MU, and FA. The legal participants could figure out the replay attack by checking the freshness of the incoming message. Thus our proposed scheme can resist the replay attack.
Impersonation Attack
In the roaming authentication, we need to consider three scenarios of impersonation attack, i.e., on MU, on visiting FA, and finally on HA. The details are as follows: 
Perfect Forward Secrecy
Suppose  wants to compute the session key problem. Thus, the session key is not acquired. As a result, the forward secrecy is provided in the proposed scheme.
Fair Key Agreement
Our proposed scheme ends up with MU and FA agreeing on shared session key MF SK where both the parties ensure equal contribution. i.e., the session key 1 4 = (
MF MU H i SK h ID P K P h X T T αβ α γ       is computed using the random points with individual identities produced by MU and FA, respectively. Such as, , MU P ID αβ and H K P α are the random number points with identities produced by MU and FA. This clearly signifies the equal contribution of the participants (MU/FA). In this way, our key agreement protocol can assure the fairness property.
Mutual Entity Authentication
Our proposed scheme supports mutual authentication among MU, FA and HA. 
Note: √= preserved; ×= not preserved. number points with identities produced by MU and FA . This clearly signifies the equal contribution of the participants (MU/FA). In this way, our key agreement protocol can assure the fairness property.
Our proposed scheme supports mutual authentication among MU, FA and HA. Table 2 Security attributes
Note: √= preserved; ×= not preserved. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have reviewed the well designed Zhang et al.'s authentication scheme for GLOMONET, and presented various security pitfalls which include password guessing attack, impersonation attack, replay attack, user anonymity and traceability attack. To overcome the security weaknesses of Zhang et al.'s scheme, we have designed an authentication scheme for GLOMON- ETs. The security analysis has been done using standard formal provable security proof. The informal cryptanalysis proofs to the resilience of relevant security attacks have been presented. The analysis of proposed scheme demonstrates that the proposed scheme addresses both security and privacy challenges. Results prove that the proposed scheme is efficient.
